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INTRODUCTION 
In a recent essay on what he identifies as “customary deviations” 
from the dictates of the Internal Revenue Code, Professor Larry 
Zelenak asserts that the Internal Revenue Service has regularly 
created administrative deviations from the Code that produce 
taxpayer-favorable results that cannot be challenged in the courts 
because taxpayers lack standing to bring such challenges.1 He worries 
that “the lack of any judicial check on unauthorized giveaways by tax 
administrators threatens rule-of-law values,”2 and he concludes by 
proposing “legislation aimed at retaining the practical advantages of 
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 1. See generally Lawrence A. Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration 
of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829 (2012) (evaluating administratively created customary 
deviations from the Internal Revenue Code). 
 2. Id. at 833. 
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customary deviations while assuaging rule-of-law concerns.”3 To 
illustrate the customary deviations that he identifies, Professor 
Zelenak analyzes the IRS’s announced decision not to take the 
position that employee-retained frequent flyer miles earned on 
employer-funded or business travel produce income when used for 
personal travel by employees, but observes that other examples 
abound. 
As Professor Zelenak notes, we have devoted some effort to 
exploring the gap between the expansive literal meaning of various 
statutory and judicial definitions of income and the narrower meaning 
that emerges from IRS policies and practices.4 Professor Zelenak’s 
concern is that our view “stretches beyond the breaking point the 
concept of what counts as an interpretation.”5 As he explains: 
According to Professors Abreu and Greenstein, the statutory 
definition of gross income (as glossed by Glenshaw Glass) “gives the 
IRS the flexibility to navigate the shoals of social opinion regarding 
income taxation, thereby . . . permitting the evolution of a concept of 
income that serves . . . important values in taxation,” including “a 
variety of noneconomic values.” This stretches beyond the breaking 
point the concept of what counts as an interpretation. Nothing in the 
language or legislative history of § 61, and nothing in Glenshaw 
Glass, suggests (for example) that employee-retained frequent-flier 
miles are not within the definition of gross income.6 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. See generally Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX 
REV. 295 (2011) [hereinafter Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income] (suggesting that the IRS 
considers both economic and noneconomic values when applying the definition of income); 
Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule: A Better Way to Understand the 
Definition of Income, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 101 (2012) [hereinafter Abreu & Greenstein, It’s Not a 
Rule] (suggesting that standards are superior to rules in interpreting the definition of income). 
 5. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 836–37. 
 6. Id. (citing Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 4, at 300) (alterations in 
original). Professor Zelenak goes on to observe:  
Moreover, the IRS has never stated that frequent-flier miles are not within the scope 
of § 61. In fact, the IRS’s most significant pronouncement on the topic—its 2002 
announcement—implies the opposite when it states that “the IRS has not pursued a 
tax enforcement program” with respect to frequent-flier miles and notes that “[a]ny 
future guidance on the taxability of these benefits will be applied prospectively.” 
Thus, far from claiming that its position is an interpretation of the statute, the IRS 
acknowledges that it is not enforcing the law.  
Id. at 837 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). But the most that can be said about these 
IRS pronouncements is that they are ambiguous. Perhaps, as Professor Zelenak believes, the 
agency is “acknowledg[ing] that it is not enforcing the law.” Id. Alternatively, the IRS may be 
saying that it is not sure what the law is and is foregoing enforcement pending clarification of 
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While there is actually much that the three of us agree about, 
disagreement remains: What we view as interpretation, Professor 
Zelenak views as deviation. A deviation requires identifying a clear 
path (or rule) from which the deviation occurs. Professor Zelenak 
finds that path in what he refers to as “the Code as written.”7 It seems 
that, for him, the Code provides rules that are to be strictly 
interpreted, so IRS positions that are inconsistent with that strict 
interpretation are deviations. We offer a different analysis. We posit 
that what may look like a rule can, upon closer inspection, reveal 
itself to be a standard. Such a closer inspection involves consideration 
of how the provision has been administered. In the specific case of the 
definition of income under section 61(a) of the Code,8 we asserted in 
Defining Income that both the IRS and the courts have treated the 
definition of income as a standard rather than a rule, and that 
acknowledging the provision to be a standard clarifies its non-linear 
construction.9 If there is no rule that all accessions are income, there 
is no need to find an exception or posit a deviation in order to 
conclude that a particular accession is not income. In short, where 
Professor Zelenak sees a deviation that threatens rule-of-law values, 
we see a non-exceptional, fully lawful interpretation of a standard. 
We do not claim that all provisions of the Code are standards. Many 
are rules—but not the definition of income. 
Professor Zelenak’s essay makes an important contribution by 
clearly identifying a central concern regarding the IRS’s treatment of 
income: respect for the rule of law. Professor Zelenak’s concern is 
that 
[t]o anyone who takes the rule of law seriously, it is troubling to 
contemplate that the Treasury and the IRS are almost 
unconstrained in their ability to make de facto revisions to the 
Internal Revenue Code enacted by Congress, as long as those 
revisions are in a taxpayer-favorable direction. It is especially 
 
the law’s meaning. Or, perhaps, the IRS believes that employee-retained frequent flyer miles 
are not income. 
 7. Id. at 840. 
 8. Section 61(a) provides that: “Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross 
income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the 
following items . . . .” I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012). The canonical definition of “gross income” comes 
from Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). See infra note 31 and 
accompanying text. 
 9. Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 4, at 346. See also Abreu & 
Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule, supra note 4, at 103–04 (discussing the argument from Defining 
Income that income should be interpreted as a standard). 
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troubling to think that the relatively innocent customary deviations 
in the gross income context may have bred a disrespect for the rule 
of law on the part of the Treasury and the IRS, so that tax 
administrators now believe they have the power and the authority to 
disregard any Code section when doing so would further their 
notion (not Congress’s notion) of good tax policy.10 
Addressing this concern directly allows us to refine our analysis 
of the role of rules and standards in federal income tax law. For 
Professor Zelenak, respect for the rule of law entails an obligation of 
the Treasury and the IRS not to “disregard [the] Code,”11 i.e., to 
follow the dictates of the statute. This, in turn, assumes that the Code, 
properly interpreted, specifies the answers to questions about its 
correct application—answers that Treasury and the IRS are bound to 
follow. In other words, it assumes that the Code is properly read as a 
compendium of rules whose meaning is independent of the 
interpreter. 
This Essay seeks to demonstrate that the interpretive use of 
standards in applying provisions of the Code is not inconsistent with 
the rule of law. Part I discusses the relationship between rules and the 
rule of law and explains why we think so many tax scholars are drawn 
to a view of the tax law as consisting primarily of rules. We then 
demonstrate that the definition of income is properly understood as a 
standard. Part II addresses the descriptive dimension of this claim, 
summarizing and expanding our previous discussion of the definition 
of income to determine whether the term is susceptible to 
construction as a rule. We show that even a brief trip through some of 
the litigation required to determine whether certain items are income 
leads to the conclusion that the definition of income is not a rule. Part 
III addresses the normative dimension of our claim. There, we tease 
 
 10. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 851. Professor Zelenak limits his definition of customary 
deviations to taxpayer-favorable interpretations and worries about their potential corrosive 
effect on rule of law values because a pro-taxpayer interpretation is effectively immune from 
challenge, given that taxpayers directly affected would have no interest in challenging it and 
others would lack standing to do so. Id. at 847–52. We agree that anti-taxpayer positions are 
much more likely to be challenged—and indeed nearly all tax litigation consists of such 
challenges—but we do not think that anti-taxpayer positions are fundamentally different from 
pro-taxpayer positions for that reason alone. Anti-taxpayer positions will be challenged when 
the amounts are large enough and the taxpayers are wealthy enough or have sufficient access to 
free or low-cost representation to bring a challenge, but too often the Service’s assertion of an 
anti-taxpayer position produces a compromise or capitulation by the taxpayer because of the 
cost of mounting a challenge.  
 11. Id. at 851. 
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out the functions served by interpreting income as a standard and 
question where the interpretive authority lies with respect to the 
Code in order to argue that income ought to be treated as a standard. 
Part IV turns to several examples of what Professor Zelenak regards 
as either a “disregard” or an “underenforcement” of the law to clarify 
our understanding of interpretation. We then conclude by observing 
that the Code does not “read itself”: Deciding whether a provision is 
itself a rule or a standard is itself an act of interpretation. Moreover, 
interpreting a provision as a standard is fully consistent with the rule 
of law. 
I.  RULES AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Exploring the connection between the rule of law and the use of 
rules has occupied many scholars. One notable example is Justice 
Antonin Scalia. Nearly a quarter century ago, in the context of 
judicial decisionmaking, Justice Scalia linked the rule of law to the 
use of rules,12 and the lucidity of his exposition and his explicit 
discussion of the role of values make his analysis a particularly good 
point of departure. Justice Scalia identified a set of values—rule of 
law values—promoted by rules. He described one of these values as 
“the appearance of equal treatment,”13 arguing that “equality of 
treatment is difficult to demonstrate”14 when ad hoc evaluations of the 
situation following from a “discretion-conferring approach”15 are the 
basis for judgment. When two similar cases have opposite outcomes, 
Justice Scalia argued, our “sense of justice,” is not satisfied by the 
mere fact that the two cases are, in fact, different, but rather by their 
being “seen to be so.”16 And application of “a clear, previously 
enunciated rule that one can point to in explanation of the decision”17 
is more likely to address our desire for justice than is a decision 
supported only by the totality of the circumstances. 
A second rule-of-law value Justice Scalia identified is certainty. 
“[U]ncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of 
Law. Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must 
 
 12. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175 (1989) (analyzing the dichotomy between rule of law and judicial discretion). 
 13. Id. at 1178. 
 14. Id. at 1182. 
 15. Id. at 1177. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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have the means of knowing what it prescribes.”18 The rule of law 
allows us to avoid punishment by conforming our conduct to the law’s 
dictates. We would add, more generally, that the rule of law speaks to 
our desire to assert some control over our lives by being able to 
anticipate the legal consequences of our conduct—for example, by 
making enforceable wills and enforceable agreements. Certainty, 
Justice Scalia argued, is undermined by the “totality of the 
circumstances” approach that is characteristic of standards.19 Rules 
offer a better route to certainty and its cousins, uniformity and 
predictability. Indeed, these values are so important to him that he 
believes that “[t]here are times when even a bad rule is better than no 
rule at all.”20 
Finally, again in the context of judicial decisionmaking, Justice 
Scalia saw the use of rules as providing an “effective check upon 
arbitrary judges . . . . Only by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves 
in.”21 Indeed, this “check” on the power of government officials is 
perhaps the most powerful of the rule-of-law values. And while 
Justice Scalia was concerned with the power of judges, limiting the 
power of the Executive is arguably even more important, given its 
direct control of severe, even deadly, coercive power. 
At the core of these three rule-of-law values—the appearance of 
equal protection, certainty about what the law requires, and 
constraining the power of officials—is predictability, and rules seem 
to promise the desired predictability insofar as they involve, as 
conventionally understood, ex ante resolutions of the various 
competing considerations that the all-things-considered approach 
associated with standards performs ex post.22 To use a favorite rules-
standards chestnut, a rule prohibiting speeds on the highway in excess 
of fifty-five miles per hour seems to tell us in advance most of what 
we need to know about what the law requires. By contrast, a standard 
requiring prudent driving seems less predictable as it appears to leave 
 
 18. Id. at 1179. 
 19. See id. (arguing that adopting the “totality of the circumstances” test would signify that 
uniformity is unimportant). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1180. 
 22. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. REV. 
557, 559–60 (1992); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860 
(1999); David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 248 (2002); 
David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. (2002). 
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much of the judgment to the post hoc assessment of some 
decisionmaker. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that there seems to be a strong 
motivation to read the Internal Revenue Code as a compendium of 
rules.23 People do not like paying taxes, by and large, and thus 
demand that the Code be administered in a consistent and even-
handed way. No taxpayer wants penalty exposure, and even 
compliant taxpayers do not want to overpay. All taxpayers, therefore, 
expect certainty about what the tax law requires.24 Finally, there is a 
long libertarian tradition in this country of distrust of government and 
resentment of the taxing authority in particular (after all, the 
Revolutionary War was motivated in large part by resistance to 
taxation), so constraining the power of IRS officials seems 
important.25 One way of capturing the confluence of these important 
goals is to invoke what is perhaps the most salient characteristic of 
our income tax system: the need of taxpayers to account, on an 
annual or more frequent basis, to the government, on specific forms, 
containing specific lines, requiring specific computations, involving 
precise numbers. Reading the Code as a compendium of rules offers 
the hope of just the kind of predictability that will serve this need. 
The desire to read the Code as a compendium of rules supports, 
in turn, the appeal of a “plain meaning” approach to statutory 
interpretation. As Justice Scalia noted, “the extent to which one can 
elaborate general rules from a statutory or constitutional command 
depends considerably upon how clear and categorical one 
understands the command to be, which in turn depends considerably 
upon one’s method of textual exegesis. For example, it is perhaps 
easier for me than it is for some judges to develop general rules, 
 
 23. As Professor Weisbach has observed, “The tax law is the paradigmatic system of rules.” 
See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, supra note 22, at 860. 
 24. See David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters, supra note 22, at 247–51. 
Professor Weisbach argues that rules provide certainty because they specify “the law in advance 
of taxpayers acting.” Id. at 247. He provides an excellent discussion of the relationship between 
certainty, complexity, and compliance, and the use of rules or standards, which is consistent with 
the well-documented connection between compliance, type of income, and third-party 
reporting. See also Andrew Johns and John Slemrod, The Distribution of Income Tax 
Noncompliance, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 397, 403 (2010) (noting that taxpayer noncompliance is 
smallest with respect to items subject to third-party reporting to the IRS). 
 25. While a discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this paper, we want to 
acknowledge the competing view offered by historian Robin Einhorn, who has made the 
compelling and provocative claim that American distrust of government and taxation is rooted 
not in the value of liberty but in the legacy of slavery. ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN 
TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 7 (2006). 
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because I am more inclined to adhere closely to the plain meaning of 
a text.”26 In short, the affinity between the plain meaning approach 
and rules lies in the fact that both reflect the core rule-of-law quality 
of predictability. 
Our point is not that Professor Zelenak and Justice Scalia share a 
full-blown jurisprudence. But they do share a devotion to the rule of 
law, and both are attracted to interpreting statutory texts as rules to 
promote rule-of-law values. Moreover, just as Justice Scalia finds that 
the plain meaning approach advances that project, Professor Zelenak 
asserts that the IRS has a duty to apply the Code “as written” and 
that customary deviations, such as the failure to count employee-
retained frequent flyer miles as income, are violations of that duty.27 
But if we apply section 61(a)28 “as written,” does it really tell us 
that employee-retained frequent-flier miles are gross income?29 Our 
claim is that in order to answer that question, we must first determine 
whether the definition of income is to be interpreted as a rule, or as a 
standard. 
II.  INCOME AS RULE OR STANDARD? 
In this Part we argue that the term “gross income” in section 
61(a) has been interpreted as a standard. It is important to distinguish 
this claim—a descriptive claim about what the law is—from the claim 
we will make in Part III: a normative claim that the definition of 
income should be treated as a standard. Here, we argue that the long 
history of determining what items are included in “gross income” 
reveals a consistent practice by the Internal Revenue Service and by 
the courts of treating income as a standard. And we insist that a 
consistent practice of treating income as a standard by those charged 
with the administration of federal income tax law makes it a standard. 
Put another way, the meaning of a provision of law like section 61(a), 
including whether it is a rule or a standard, is not determinable at the 
time of its promulgation; rather, its meaning emerges from the way 
that it is regarded and used by those having interpretive and 
 
 26. Scalia, supra note 12, at 1183–84. 
 27. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 840, 844, 851. 
 28. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 29. In this Essay we adopt the practice of using the terms “gross income” and “income” 
interchangeably.  
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enforcement authority.30 Accordingly, we can determine whether a 
provision like section 61(a) is a rule or a standard by examining that 
historical practice. 
Section 61(a) is famously circular. It defines gross income as “all 
income from whatever source derived,” but does not further define 
the term “income.” That task fell to the Supreme Court, which 
defined income in Glenshaw Glass as “undeniable accessions to 
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete 
dominion.”31 Following Glenshaw Glass, section 61 should therefore 
be read to provide that gross income is “all undeniable accessions to 
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete 
dominion from whatever source derived.” Given the breadth of this 
language it is not surprising that both scholars and courts often talk 
about the “all-inclusive language of § 61(a).”32 Yet, the only language 
in section 61 itself that might be described this way is “all” and “from 
any source derived.” Anything else has to come from what the Court 
has defined as income, and an analysis of what the Court has defined 
as income confirms that it has not sought to establish a rule. Rather, 
in defining income, the Court in Glenshaw Glass and the other courts 
that followed it, as well as the IRS, have made it clear that the 
definition of income is subject to precisely the type of evolutionary 
development typical of standards, rather than the rigid application of 
a rule. 
The dynamic evolution of the definition of income is revealed by 
considering some of the litigation over what constitutes income. This 
litigation includes Supreme Court decisions on issues such as whether 
the “mere conversion of capital assets” produces income,33 whether a 
 
 30. See Richard K. Greenstein, Toward a Jurisprudence of Social Values, 8 WASH. U. 
JURIS. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2516380. 
 31. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
 32. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 26 
(12th ed. 2012); see also Zelenak, supra note 1, at 834 (noting “the sweeping language of I.R.C. 
§ 61”); Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432 (“The definition of gross income has been simplified, 
but no effect upon its present broad scope was intended.”). 
 33. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 184 (1918). This case is an example of the 
IRS standing firm in its position and fighting a losing battle through the court system. The IRS 
began litigation and lost in the District Court. Mitchell Bros. Co. v. Doyle, 225 F. 437, 441 (W.D. 
Mich. 1915). The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s ruling and denied the 
IRS’s request for a rehearing. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 235 F. 686, 693 (6th Cir. 1916). 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with the District and Circuit Courts. Mitchell Bros., 247 
U.S. at 189. 
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pro-rata stock dividend is income to a shareholder,34 whether payment 
of an employee’s taxes by the employer is income to the employee,35 
and whether punitive damages are income.36 And indeed, this 
evolution is so dynamic that the Supreme Court has come to opposite 
conclusions on the very same issue: it concluded in Commissioner v. 
Wilcox37 that embezzled funds were not income but then concluded in 
James v. United States38 that they were. Other examples of the Court’s 
difficulty of defining income abound.39 The lower federal courts have 
 
 34. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 199 (1920). The Supreme Court ruled against the 
IRS in affirming the judgment for the taxpayer. Id. at 219. 
 35. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 720 (1929). This case began when the 
Commissioner notified the taxpayer of deficiencies in his income tax resulting from a failure to 
report the income received by payment of his taxes by his employer. The issue was heard by the 
Board of Tax Appeals, which agreed with the Commissioner. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 
7 B.T.A. 648, 652 (1927). The Court of Appeals reviewed and affirmed the Board’s decision. 
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 33 F.2d 891, 891 (1st Cir. 1929). The Supreme Court 
ultimately affirmed. Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 731. 
 36. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 429. Here, the Tax Court agreed with the taxpayers that 
punitive damages were not income. Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Comm’r, 18 T.C. 860, 872 (1952). 
The taxpayers also won in the Court of Appeals. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F.2d 928, 
934 (3d Cir. 1954). However, the IRS won in the Supreme Court, which reversed. Glenshaw 
Glass, 348 U.S. at 433. See also William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Comm’r, 19 T.C. 637, 641 
(1953) (holding the opposite, but decided prior to Glenshaw Glass). 
 37. Comm’r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 410 (1946). The long-running debate over whether 
embezzled funds are income started in the Tax Court, which ruled in favor of the government 
(income). On appeal, the decision of the Tax Court was reversed (not income). Wilcox v. 
Comm’r, 148 F.2d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 1945). Finally, the government lost again when the Supreme 
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’s decision that the embezzled funds were not income. 
Wilcox, 327 U.S. at 410. 
 38. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 222 (1961). The government won in the District 
Court and Court of Appeals. United States v. James, 273 F.2d 5, 7 (7th Cir. 1959). It won again 
when the Supreme Court overruled its previous decision in Wilcox and affirmed the lower 
courts’ decisions, holding that embezzled funds are income to the embezzler. James, 366 U.S. at 
222. 
 39. For example, in Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956), the IRS changed its 
position several times on whether the bargain element in an employee stock option was income. 
It litigated and lost the issue in the Tax Court, LoBue v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 440, 445 (1954), 
then acquiesced in that decision, 1954 C.B. 2, but then withdrew the acquiescence, 1955-2 C.B. 
10 n.9. It appealed and lost again in Commissioner v. LoBue, 223 F.2d 367, 371 (3d Cir. 1955), 
but ultimately won in the Supreme Court. LoBue, 351 U.S. at 250. In United States v. Kirby 
Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 2 (1931), where the issue was whether a corporation’s repurchase of its 
bonds at less than the issue price generated income to the corporation, the Court of Claims 
ruled in favor of the taxpayer, finding no income. Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States, 44 F.2d 
885, 887 (Ct. Cl. 1930). The Supreme Court, however, reversed and found income. Kirby 
Lumber, 284 U.S. at 3. In United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 590–91 (1951), the issue was 
whether receipt of amounts in error produced income in the year of receipt even if the amounts 
were returned in a subsequent year. The Court of Claims agreed with the taxpayer that there 
was no income in the year of receipt, Lewis v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 1017, 1022 (Ct. Cl. 
1950), but the United States Supreme Court reversed. Lewis, 340 U.S. at 592. In Edwards v. 
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considered whether the following constitute income: meals and 
lodging received by an employee and his wife for the convenience of 
the employer;40 farm produce grown and eaten by the farmer41 or in-
store groceries consumed by the store owner;42 and amounts received 
by a taxpayer from his lawyer to compensate for federal income tax 
paid as a result of bad tax advice.43 
Though necessarily incomplete, this brief survey reveals that the 
definition of income cannot be obvious. It requires much litigation to 
discern and produces in the same case different conclusions by 
different courts. Even the IRS has changed its position with respect to 
the includability of amounts like the bargain element in stock 
options44 and compensation for excessive federal income taxes paid as 
a result of bad tax advice.45 
The long saga over the treatment of interest-free loans provides 
yet another view of the evolution of the definition of income and the 
interaction of the IRS, the courts, and the legislature in that 
evolution. The IRS’s position evolved from asserting in a published 
 
Cuba Railroad Co., 268 U.S. 628, 631 (1925), where the issue was whether subsidies paid by the 
Cuban government to a U.S. corporation were income, the District Court ruled in favor of the 
taxpayer. Cuba R.R. Co. v. Edwards, 298 F. 664, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). The Supreme Court 
agreed and affirmed the earlier decision. Cuba R.R. Co., 268 U.S. at 633. 
 40. Benaglia v. Comm’r, 36 B.T.A. 838, 838–39 (1937). The Board of Tax Appeals 
disagreed with the Commissioner and announced what became known as the convenience of the 
employer doctrine, later codified in section 119. Id. at 841. 
 41. Morris v. Comm’r, 9 B.T.A. 1273, 1273 (1928), acq., VII-2 C.B. 75 (1928). In this case, 
the Court ruled against the government in favoring the taxpayer’s position that the crops 
produced on his farm for his personal benefit are not income to the farmer. Id. at 1281. The 
government abandoned its previous position on the matter and acquiesced to the ruling. VII-2 
C.B. 75 (1928). 
 42. Dicenso v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 620, 620–21 (1928). 
 43. Clark v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 333, 333–34 (1939), nonacq., 1939-2 C.B. 45, acq., 1957-1 
C.B. 4. The IRS lost this case. Id. at 335. Here, the government and the taxpayer disagreed 
about whether payment from the taxpayer’s tax practitioner for his error in computing the 
taxpayer’s return should be considered a payment of taxes, as it would if governed by Old 
Colony Trust, or compensation for loss of capital. Id. at 334–35. The Court favored the taxpayer 
and ruled that there was no income to the taxpayer. Id. at 335. This proved to be another 
example of the IRS changing its position on the matter, as it did not acquiesce to this decision in 
1939, but nearly 20 years later, in 1957. 1957-1 C.B. 4. 
 44. LoBue, 351 U.S. at 250. 
 45. Clark, 40 B.T.A. at 333–34. Even the most ordinary business transactions raise 
questions that require defining income. For example, if an enterprise facilitates a prospective 
investor’s decision whether to invest by subsidizing the investor’s (and spouse’s) investigatory 
trip, is that income to the investor? The IRS said yes; the District Court said no, Gotcher v. 
United States, 259 F. Supp. 340, 345 (E.D. Tex. 1966); and the Court of Appeals split the 
difference, finding no income with respect to the investor’s expenses, but income with respect to 
his wife’s, United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 124 (5th Cir. 1968). 
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ruling in 1955 that the “mere making available of money does not 
result in realized income to the payee,”46 to litigating precisely the 
opposite position six years later in Dean v. Commissioner47 and 
numerous other cases. The issue was decided more than two decades 
later by the Government’s victory in Dickman v. Commissioner48 and 
the enactment of section 7872, which treats foregone interest as 
income, or a gift, depending on the circumstances. 
The items that caused the litigation in these cases are not 
instances of bizarre types of accessions to wealth—marginal cases that 
might be disputed in the application of any legal category. Rather, the 
fact that they are subject to litigation, the variety of judicial opinions 
with respect to the same item,49 and the changes to the IRS’s own 
positions before and after litigation,50 show that the definition of 
income is not patent. If employee-retained frequent flyer miles are, as 
Professor Zelenak argues, a straightforward example of income, then 
one might well think that embezzled funds are, too; however, Wilcox 
involved a disagreement among the various federal courts that heard 
 
 46. Rev. Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 C.B. 23. 
 47. Dean v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961). 
 48. Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330 (1984). Dickman addressed the gift tax aspect of 
interest-free loans, but it was clear that if foregone interest were property of value so as to 
constitute a gift, it would also constitute income when the loan occurred in a compensatory 
context rather than in a donative context. Congress clearly agreed, since the legislative response 
to Dickman, the enactment of section 7872, covers both types of loans. Id. at 338. See generally 
Phillip J. Closius, Below Market Loans: From Abuse to Misuse—A Sports Illustration, 37 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 484 (1987) (discussing enactment of section 7872); H.R. REP. NO. 98-861, at 
1011 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 1699. 
 49. For example, in Lewis, the U.S. Court of Claims ruled in favor of the taxpayer, only for 
the decision to be reversed by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 592 
(1951). In Kirby Lumber, the taxpayer won in the Court of Claims, but lost in the Supreme 
Court. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931). The Tax Court in Wilcox 
agreed with the government, while the subsequent Circuit Court and Supreme Court decisions 
were pro-taxpayer. See Comm’r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 410 (1946). The taxpayers in Glenshaw 
Glass won in the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals only to lose in the Supreme Court. See 
Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 433 (1955). In LoBue, the taxpayers won in the 
Tax Court and the Circuit Court, but lost in the Supreme Court, see Comm’r v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 
243, 250 (1956), and the IRS changed its position along the way. Finally, though less 
dramatically, in Gotcher the District Court found in favor of the taxpayers, while the Circuit 
Court found no income in the case of one taxpayer but income in the case of the other, both 
affirming and reversing the lower court decision. See United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 124 
(5th Cir. 1968).  
 50. In LoBue the IRS initially acquiesced to the Tax Court’s pro-taxpayer decision, but 
later withdrew its acquiescence and appealed the issue. See LoBue, 351 U.S. at 247. Although it 
lost in Clark, the IRS acquiesced in the decision eighteen years later. See Clark v. Comm’r, 40 
B.T.A. 333, 334 (1939). After losing in Morris, the IRS quickly acquiesced. See Morris v. 
Comm’r, 9 B.T.A. 1273, 1281 (1928). 
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the case,51 and James resulted in the Supreme Court’s overruling its 
own fifteen-year-old precedent (Wilcox). The very controversy over 
the inclusion of fringe benefits, which Professor Zelenak so 
comprehensively describes,52 reveals the uncertainty: first, the IRS did 
not seek to include the benefits in employees’ income; then, it 
announced that it would include them; Congress disagreed; and 
finally, a legislative enactment provided a compromise and some 
certainty.53 
The project we began in Defining Income was initially motivated 
by the need to understand why the IRS and the courts in so many 
instances have failed to tax various accessions to wealth, 
notwithstanding the absence of statutory provisions excluding those 
accessions from the definition of income. This problem arises because 
the introductory language of section 61(a)—“Except as otherwise 
provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from 
whatever source derived”—is generally taken to mean that exclusions 
from the definition of income require statutory authorization.54 
Consequently, interpreting the definition of income as a rule requires 
justification for the creation of many exceptions for which no 
statutory authority exists. 
For example, although the IRS initially ruled that the retention 
of unsolicited books by a book reviewer was income,55 it later changed 
its position, ruling that receipt alone would not result in income.56 
After describing this, Professor Marvin Chirelstein asked, “Can the 
Commissioner simply disregard the all-inclusive language of § 61(a) 
when it suits him, and exclude what would otherwise be includable? 
 
 51. The Tax Court held that embezzled money was income, but the 9th Circuit and the 
Supreme Court disagreed and found no income. See Comm’r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 410 
(1946). In James, a few years later, the District Court agreed with the government that 
embezzled funds were income, and the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court also agreed, 
although this required the remarkable step of having the Supreme Court overrule its fifteen-
year-old decision in Wilcox. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 216–17 (1961). In 
Glenshaw Glass, the IRS lost in the Tax Court and Court of Appeals but eventually prevailed in 
the Supreme Court. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 433 (1955). 
 52. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 842–44. 
 53. See Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-121, 117 Stat. 1335 
(codified at I.R.C. § 132 (2012)). 
 54. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 55. Rev. Rul. 70-330, 1970-1 C.B. 14. 
 56. Rev. Rul. 70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6. 
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Answer: yes.”57 Implicit in Professor Chirelstein’s assertion that the 
Commissioner was disregarding the language of section 61 is the 
assumption that the language of section 61 and hence of the 
Glenshaw Glass definition, must be read as a rule. We agree that if 
“all accessions” inflexibly means “all” accessions, unsolicited samples 
would come within the definition of income, and the IRS’s failure to 
tax them would amount to an exclusion unsupported by statutory 
authorization. But we believe that the language has not, need not, and 
should not be so construed. 
Consider the distinction drawn in Benaglia between wages paid 
by a hotel to its on-site manager (gross income) and meals and 
lodging furnished to that same manager (not gross income).58 
Although both were provided in connection with employment and 
both benefitted the employee, as the court acknowledged (the meals 
and lodging “may relieve [the employee] of an expense which he 
would otherwise bear”),59 only the former was deemed 
“compensation.” And although both were provided by the employer 
in order to further its business interests, only the latter was 
characterized as having been furnished “solely for the convenience of 
[the] employer.”60 Thus, applying the concept of income as a rule, 
pursuant to which all accessions are income, does not support the 
court’s distinction. 
While treating section 61 as setting forth a rule does not explain 
the court’s reasoning and decision in Benaglia or the IRS’s ruling with 
respect to unsolicited samples, treating the definition of income as a 
standard pursuant to which many factors are relevant, does. The 
conclusions of the court in Benaglia and the IRS in the unsolicited 
samples ruling reflect consideration of a variety of factors. For 
example, as Professor Chirelstein has suggested with respect to 
Benaglia: 
 
 57. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 25 (11th ed. 2005). See also 
CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 32, at 26 (discussing the different IRS approaches 
determining whether or not the retention of unsolicited textbooks is income). 
 58. We are not the only ones who have questioned this. Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak 
have made a similar observation: “The emphasis in Benaglia and in § 119 on the employer’s 
convenience has been questioned by many writers.” CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 32, 
at 20. They go on to provide a persuasive critique of the emphasis on the convenience of the 
employer. 
 59. Benaglia v. Comm’r, 36 B.T.A. 838, 840 (1937). 
 60. Id. at 838. 
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Perhaps, however, the “convenience-of-the-employer” rule is really 
a short-hand way of acknowledging the factor of restricted 
preference . . . . In Benaglia . . . , there is an element of personal 
compulsion which raises doubt about the value of the benefit to the 
recipient. Thus the hotel-manager must live on the hotel premises if 
he is to do his job (or at least the court in Benaglia so found).61 
And, with respect to the unsolicited samples ruling: 
On reflection, the Commissioner must have decided that the 
administrative effort—identifying the textbook recipients 
(thousands of school-teachers), persuading them that the books 
were indeed “income,” placing a value on the books, and then 
checking individual tax returns to be sure the correct amounts were 
reported—was not worth the auditing expense that such an effort 
would entail.62 
We agree that both the distinction made in Benaglia and the 
conclusion in the unsolicited samples ruling reflect a variety of 
important concerns, but our point is that precisely because of that, 
neither can be said to flow from the text of section 61(a) “as 
written.”63 And it is because such concerns cannot be ignored that it is 
so difficult to define income. 
Indeed, income is so hard to define that, in addition to the cases 
that purport to set forth a definition (e.g., Glenshaw Glass, 
Macomber) and decide the treatment of specific items (e.g., meals and 
lodging and illegal gains), courts have felt the need to develop a 
variety of doctrines to further limn the contours of the term. 
Examples abound: claim of right,64 assignment of income,65 
 
 61. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 57, at 21. See also CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 32, 
at 21 (discussing possible explanations for “the convenience-of-employer” rule).  
 62. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 57, at 25. See also CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 32, 
at 26–27 (discussing the IRS’s change of position on the textbook-income rule).  
 63. The tenuous nature of the distinction can also be seen in the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Commissioner v. LoBue, in which the Court explicitly rejected the Tax Court’s reasoning that 
the bargain element in an employee stock option was not income because the option was 
granted by the employer to give the employee a proprietary interest in the business. Comm’r v. 
LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 247 (1956). 
 64. See N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932) (holding “[i]f a taxpayer 
receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has 
received income which he is required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not 
entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its 
equivalent.”). See also United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 592 (1951) (finding that a taxpayer 
cannot retroactively adjust tax payment in a previous year if repayment occurred in a 
subsequent year). 
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constructive receipt,66 constructive dividends,67 and so forth. Treating 
the definition of income as a standard whose contours are shaped by a 
variety of considerations provides a theoretically satisfactory 
explanation for the decisions of the courts and the IRS, as well as for 
the development of the doctrines that have come to be crucial in 
determining the existence of income. 
 
 65. The assignment of income doctrine, treating amounts as income to the earner or owner 
of property that generated the income was born in 1930 when the Supreme Court refused to 
allow a valid contract to dictate the tax consequences of earnings, explaining, “[t]here is no 
doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax 
could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully [sic] devised 
to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.” 
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930). See also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 120 (1940) 
(finding that when a father maintains control of bonds that he has purchased for his son and 
merely transfers the coupon to his son, the father must pay the tax on the income from 
coupons); Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 438 (2005) (finding that a litigant’s recovery 
constitutes income to the litigant even with respect to the portion of the recovery due to the 
attorney on a contingency basis); United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 457 (1973) (finding 
payments into a retirement trust for a partnership are includible in gross income and taxable to 
the beneficiary partners). 
 66. The doctrine of constructive receipt treats an amount as income when it is either 
actually or “constructively” received: 
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer’s possession is constructively 
received by him in the taxable year during which it is credited to his account, set apart 
for him, or otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it at any time, or so 
that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of intention to 
withdraw had been given. However, income is not constructively received if the 
taxpayer’s control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979). As the Tax Court has explained, “[t]he basis of 
constructive receipt is essentially unfettered control by the recipient over the date of actual 
receipt.” Hornung v. Comm’r, 47 T.C. 428, 434 (1967). See also Carter v. Comm’r, 40 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 654 (1980) (finding a cash basis taxpayer has taxable income for the year in which his 
wages were actually received because although they were due to him in the prior year, he could 
not have obtained them in that prior year as a result of a bureaucratic mistake); Fetzer 
Refrigerator Co. v. United States, 437 F.2d 577, 580 (6th Cir. 1971) (finding a controlling 
shareholder constructively received rents due to him by the corporation because he had the 
authority to draw checks for the company). 
 67. A constructive dividend is an item that was not in form a dividend declared by a 
corporation but which is treated as a dividend for tax purposes: “It is well established that any 
expenditure made by a corporation for the personal benefit of its stockholders or the making 
available of corporate-owned facilities to stockholders for their personal benefit may result in 
the receipt by the stockholders of constructive dividends.” Ashby v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 409, 417 
(1968). See also Dean v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 32, 45 (1971) (finding that a corporation’s purported 
loan was actually a constructive dividend); Stan Frisbie, Inc. v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 440 
(1990) (finding that the rent-free use of a corporate sailboat was a constructive dividend); Hood 
v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 172, 182 (2000) (finding that a corporation’s payment of legal fees for its 
sole shareholder’s criminal tax evasion litigation constituted a constructive dividend).  
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III.  STANDARDS AND INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY 
If, as argued in Part II, the IRS and the courts historically 
interpreted “gross income” as a standard, the question arises: Is that 
proper? Accordingly, we turn here to the normative dimension of our 
claim. In Section A, we identify two practical reasons why it is 
important to interpret income as a standard: the need for the Code to 
be able to address new and unanticipated forms of wealth, and the 
need for tax law generally to respond to changing social needs, social 
conditions, and social and political values. We then show that viewing 
income as a standard best responds to values that animate the tax law. 
In Section B, we assert that Treasury and the IRS have the initial 
authority to determine whether a provision of the Code ought to be 
interpreted as a rule or a standard, but that what is ultimately 
desirable in tax law is a robust conversation among the three 
branches of the federal government as to the meaning of the Code. 
A. The Function of a Standard 
Reflecting on the administrative and judicial difficulties 
encountered in defining income reveals why the definition of income 
must be allowed to evolve through the process of considering 
successive disputes over what is and is not to be included within that 
category. First, as in the case of all statutes, when enacting section 61, 
Congress could not have possibly anticipated all the new phenomena 
that might become candidates for inclusion as income.68 New and 
creative forms of wealth not conceived of at the time of the Code’s 
promulgation (employee-retained frequent-flier miles, for instance), 
demand assessment as the future unfolds. 
Second, tax touches virtually all facets of life. Hence, the number 
of values relevant to determining answers to doctrinal questions in tax 
law is great.69 The large number of relevant values, in turn, has critical 
implications. Those charged with interpreting and applying the tax 
law (administrators and judges) must be able to respond to current, as 
 
 68. Eric Solomon, The Process for Making Tax Policy in the United States: A System Full of 
Friction, 67 THE TAX LAWYER 547, 556 (2014) (“The [Internal Revenue] Code is the 
foundation of the U.S. federal tax system. However, it does not answer all the tax questions that 
arise in a complex economy . . . . Because there are so many unanswered questions in the Code, 
the Treasury Department has issued thousands of pages of regulations.”). 
 69. See Abreu & Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule, supra note 4, at 128. 
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well as temporary, changes in conditions.70 Thus, for example, 
empirical research suggests that judges are more likely to embrace 
pro-government interpretations of the Code during times of national 
emergency in order to serve the contemporaneously ascendant value 
of raising revenue.71 Moreover, the effectiveness of tax law depends 
on a perception of its legitimacy by both the public and Congress, 
which requires that those charged with interpreting and applying tax 
law be especially committed to getting it right. Hence, we have 
described instances of the IRS reassessing and sometimes changing its 
view about interpretations of the tax law (e.g., whether interest-free 
loans generate income), and we have seen the same thing in the 
courts (e.g., whether embezzled amounts are gross income).72 
 
 70. Reflecting on the importance of keeping public officials from becoming insular when 
carrying out their responsibilities to interpret the law, Eric Solomon has observed that although 
the interchange of individuals between the government and the private sector can lead to the 
unfortunate perception of capture or the acquisition of inside information, it is nevertheless 
“beneficial because it enables government policymakers to understand current trends and 
issues.” Solomon, supra note 68, at 554–55. 
 71. See generally NANCY STAUDT, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE PURSE: HOW COURTS 
FUND NATIONAL DEFENSE IN TIMES OF CRISIS (2011). Professor Staudt observes that “the 
Court has gone so far as to suggest that it has a role to play in raising the revenue necessary to 
meet the nation’s wartime needs.” Id. at 2. Professor Staudt uses the Court’s own words to 
support this assertion. In explaining the rationale for a decision in a World War II tax case the 
Court explained that “we all realize it is necessary to raise every dollar of additional revenue 
that can be raised without seriously disturbing or shattering our national economy.” Id. (quoting 
Putnam v. Comm’r, 352 U.S. 82, 91 n.16 (1956)) (emphasis omitted). The quoted passage from 
Putnam appears in the portion of the opinion in which the Court struggles to ascertain 
Congressional intent. It is significant to us, as to Professor Staudt, that the Court considers the 
explicitly stated revenue-raising objective in determining Congressional intent and ultimately 
holding for the Government. Professor Staudt’s thesis that revenue needs affect judicial 
decisions is further supported by the differing outcomes in two cases familiar to every tax 
lawyer, Comm’r v. Court Holding, 324 U.S 331 (1945), and United States v. Cumberland Public 
Serv. Co., 338 U.S 451 (1950). As she observes, “The justices considered Court Holding at a time 
when the United States was fighting major wars against enemy states on several fronts, but 
Cumberland emerged after World War II had dissolved into peacetime.” Id.  
 72. This distinguishes interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code from the usual 
approach to interpreting statutes, which affords greater stare decisis effect to statutory 
interpretation than to interpretation of the Constitution. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, 77–78 (1938) (abandoning previous diversity jurisdiction approach because “the 
unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so”); 
Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 540 (1948) 
(discussing the power of the Constitution in overturning previous Supreme Court decisions); see 
also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488–89 (1940) (adhering to precedent in light of 
no legislative response); cf. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–07 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing how the Court has overturned its previous decisions on 
constitutional grounds).  
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Because of both the inevitability of unanticipated forms of 
wealth and the need for the Code’s interpreters to be exquisitely 
sensitive to social needs, changing conditions, and social and political 
values, it is especially crucial that the meaning of income be open to 
evolution. And that need suggests an explanation for the particular 
textual structure of section 61(a) and its predecessors: Section 61 is 
laid out in the classic form of ejusdem generis, i.e., it defines gross 
income by setting out a list of examples, preceded by the words 
“including (but not limited to) the following items.” Ejusdem generis 
is normally taken by the courts as an invitation to define the term 
case-by-case through analogy—by comparing a candidate for 
inclusion within the term to the list of examples73—and thereby 
permitting the definition of the term to evolve and expand.74 
Classically, ejusdem generis imposes significant constraints on 
interpretation. After all, it requires the use of a specific list as the 
analytical starting point. Nevertheless, when interpreting the meaning 
of income, courts often ignore the constraints of ejusdem generis. For 
example, the criteria announced in Glenshaw Glass (“accessions to 
wealth clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete 
dominion”) are not supported by reference either to the Code’s list or 
even to precedent.75 Indeed, the Court in Kirby Lumber explicitly 
 
 73. The classic illustration of employing the canon of ejusdem generis is McBoyle v. United 
States, in which the Court was asked to decide whether a statute which made it a crime to steal 
“an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled 
vehicle not designed for running on rails,” also made it a crime to steal an airplane. McBoyle v. 
United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26 (10th Cir. 1931). Two lower courts, finding an airplane to fit 
within the statute given that it is a “self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails,” had 
upheld the thief’s conviction. See McBoyle v. United States, 43 F.2d 273, 275 (1980). 
Nevertheless, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Applying the canon of ejusdem generis, 
Justice Holmes considered what the enumerated items had in common and compared those 
characteristics to those of an airplane. Concluding that none of the enumerated items “can be 
supposed to leave the earth,” he concluded that an airplane was not the type of “self-propelled 
vehicle not designed for running on rails” covered by the statute. McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 27. The 
thief’s conviction was therefore reversed. Id. at 27. 
 74. E.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929) (citing § 213 of the 
Revenue Act of 1916 to determine “[t]he payment of the tax by the employers was in 
consideration of the services rendered by the employee, and was again derived by the employee 
from his labor”); Morris v. Comm’r, 9 B.T.A. 1273, 1278 (1928) (“Products of a farm consumed 
by the operator thereof and his family do not appear to come within any of the categories of 
income enumerated in the taxing statutes and the administrative regulations of the 
Commissioner.”). 
 75. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (analyzing whether 
punitive damage award constitutes income); see also Benaglia v. Comm’r, 36 B.T.A. 838, 840 
(1937) (distinguishing an employee’s “compensation” (income) from an employee’s benefits 
provided “solely for the convenience of his employer” (not income)). 
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rejected the use of precedent, stating that there was “nothing to be 
gained by the discussion of judicial definitions.”76 
If the courts are not always anchoring their interpretation of 
gross income in the statutory list or in precedent, what then are they 
drawing upon? Case-by-case determination is, of course, familiar 
from the common law approach to developing the scope of doctrinal 
standards. The meaning of, say, the common law standard of 
“reasonable care” in tort law evolves through case-by-case 
consideration of specific sets of facts. It permits the evolution of that 
standard to proceed incrementally, responsive to changes in our 
understanding of the values that define tort law. Similarly, the use of 
this approach to define the scope of tax concepts such as income 
permits the definition of those concepts to evolve incrementally in 
response to the shifting social and political values that inform tax 
law.77 
We developed the idea that standards are especially sensitive to 
values in Defining Income, where we offered an account of the rules-
standards distinction. A field of law is constituted by a unique 
collection of values.78 What these values are emerges and evolves 
from the ongoing experience with answering important questions that 
arise within the field. While a specific set of values will uniquely 
 
 76. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931). 
 77. We see the fruits of this evolution in, for example, the amendment of the Code 
following Kirby Lumber to add the category held in that case to constitute income—“discharge 
of indebtedness”—to the section’s list of illustrative categories constituting the definition of 
gross income and in the Treasury regulation that supplements the list, including the addition of 
some of the items recognized as income in the cases mentioned above: punitive damages 
(Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426), “[a]nother person’s payment of the taxpayer’s income taxes” 
(Treas. Reg. 1.61-14(a) (as amended in 1993)), and illegal gains (James v. United States, 366 
U.S. 213).  
 78. For a general discussion of the problem of defining a field of law, see Todd S. Aagaard, 
Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry into Legal Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
221, 226–51 (2010). Professor Aagaard notes that “it is useful to conceptualize a legal field as the 
interaction among four underlying constitutive dimensions of the field: factual context, policy 
trade-offs, values and interests, and legal doctrine.” Id. at 238. It is our contention that “values” 
are fundamental in that they illuminate the relevant “factual context,” determine what count as 
plausible and persuasive “policy trade-offs,” and shape “legal doctrine.” On this last point, see 
our discussion of “aptness” in Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 4, at 325–33. 
See also Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 365 (2006) (suggesting that the definition of a legal concept can be assessed by 
its function in furthering multi-faceted goals and values); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and 
the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996) (discussing the benefit of developing 
uniform principles in a field of law and then applying them to specific instances rather than 
defining the field narrowly, around specific instances). 
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constitute a particular field, some of the values might be shared with 
other fields.79 Moreover, some values play a significant role in all 
fields of law—that is, they are transcendent law values. They are 
things important to law generally and include justice, administrability, 
and the rule of law. The value of justice expresses a desire to achieve 
the overall “best” answer to a legal question within a field; the value 
of administrability captures the importance of the efficient and 
effective functioning of each field; and as we have discussed above, 
the value of the rule of law reflects a yearning for predictability. 
To be successful, provisions of law within the field must promote 
some set of values from among the universe of those that define the 
field.80 The more values a provision promotes—the more questions 
that must be answered to apply the provision and thus the more facts 
that become relevant to answering those questions—the more the 
provision will operate as a standard.81 Conversely, a provision that 
promotes only a few of the constitutive values or that gives strong 
priority to one value will make relatively few facts relevant and will 
operate more as a rule.82 
In the case of tax law we have argued that a large set of values 
constitutes the field. Some of these are economic values: revenue 
raising and efficiency are especially important here. Some are values 
having to do with the vertical and horizontal equity of the tax system. 
Some are values having to do with public policy. This latter group of 
values is important not only because our income tax law addresses 
public policy by design,83 but because taxation has a potentially 
 
 79. For example, autonomy is a core value in both contract and tort law, albeit in different 
ways. Similarly, community safety is a fundamental concern in the fields of both criminal 
procedure and food-and-drug regulation. 
 80. We have called this quality “aptness.” See Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra 
note 4, at 325–33. 
 81. It is this connection between apt provisions in a field of law and the collection of values 
animating the field that provides the limiting principle for the all-things-considered analysis 
typical of standards. The “things” that must be resolved to apply those standards are the facts 
that must be determined by virtue of the relevant values. 
 82. We believe that rules and standards are not binary opposites but rather are idealized 
ends of a continuum. Actual provisions will not be purely rules or standards, but will exhibit 
varying degrees of each. See Greenstein, supra note 30, at 23–24 (making this point in terms of 
the quality of “openness”). For purposes of the analysis presented here, however, it suffices to 
speak generally of rules versus standards.  
 83. Here we are referring to tax expenditures, such as the home mortgage interest 
deduction. We recognize that despite the persistence of the popular belief that the home 
mortgage interest deduction was intended to and does promote home ownership, there is 
substantial legal and economic scholarship that questions this popular belief and suggests that 
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significant impact on just about every facet of our lives. Thus, for 
example, we have argued that the American love of baseball is a 
relevant value in deciding whether to regard baseballs caught by fans 
at games as gross income.84 
The transcendent law values mentioned above—administrability, 
the rule of law, and justice—appear to pull in different directions. The 
complex bureaucracy, the need to file returns that can be completed 
by taxpayers and administered by the IRS, the requirement of 
information reporting by a large number of parties,85 our libertarian 
traditions, and our historical resistance to taxation all make it hardly 
surprising that taxpayers, tax professionals, and tax scholars are 
attracted to interpreting the Internal Revenue Code as a 
compendium of crystalline rules. Indeed, in many instances (e.g., 
section 63(c), the standard deduction provision) it is difficult to even 
imagine reading the provision as anything other than a rule. But 
justice seems to press in the other direction, urging interpreters of the 
Code to take more values and more facts into account so that a 
provision’s application in particular cases gives us the right answer. 
That is, justice seems to suggest interpreting a provision of the Code 
as a standard. On the other hand, the rule of law might pull us back 
toward rules because predictability is so central to the rule of law and 
rules, as Justice Scalia argued, are especially good for that. 
 
the deduction increases the price of homes, rather than making home ownership more 
affordable. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing 
Bubble: How and Why the Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
751, 771 (2012) (suggesting that the price of the deduction is not only the loss in tax revenue 
without an evident increase in the rate of home ownership, but also the effective subsidy 
provided to the real estate industry through price capitalization, which is “the increase in the 
price of an asset due to the increase of value of an asset caused by a subsidy or incentive”); 
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for 
Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 278–79 (2010) (charging the deduction 
with distorting “the cost of owner-occupied housing relative to other investments, resulting in 
economy-wide misallocation of capital stock, artificially elevated housing prices, 
overconsumption of large, expensive homes, and precariously high LTV ratios”).  
 84. See Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 4, at 339–44. Even the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged baseball’s important status in American life. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 
U.S. 258, 266–67 (1972) (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)) 
(upholding antitrust exemption for professional baseball). 
 85. Indeed, information reporting is among the factors that have generated a huge market 
in software that enables the relatively automated completion, filing, review, and audit of tax 
returns. For a discussion of the connection between automation and rules, see Tom C.W. Lin, 
National Pastime(s), 55 B.C. L. REV. 1197, 1213–15 (2014) (analogizing machines to rules and 
humans to standards). 
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In reality, however, these three values interact in complex ways. 
Consider what happens if the desire to promote administrability and 
the rule of law leads us to interpret a provision as a rule, but that 
interpretation produces injustice, and that injustice, in turn, leads to 
resistance and even noncompliance. Now we have neither 
administrability nor the rule of law nor justice. Thus, the decision to 
interpret a provision cannot be made by resort to one of these three 
values alone. 
Moreover, it turns out that all three of the transcendent law 
values can support the use of both rules and standards. Justice, with 
its emphasis on getting the optimal answer, presses toward 
considering more of the relevant values and more of the consequently 
relevant facts; hence, justice pushes toward interpreting a provision as 
a standard. On the other hand, justice is also served by meeting 
expectations—a task that rules perform especially well. Similarly, the 
rule of law can be served by the use of both rules and standards. The 
rule of law emphasizes predictability,86 and that pushes toward 
interpreting a provision as a rule. On the other hand, predictability is 
also achieved by the consistent application of the values that animate 
the field—a task that standards perform especially well. Finally, 
administrability emphasizes clarity and simplicity in the service of 
predictability—a function served well by rules. But rules can produce 
injustice, which can generate resistance, which can undermine the 
efficiency and effectiveness that are the hallmarks of 
administrability.87 Hence, both rules and standards can serve the three 
 
 86. As Justice Scalia argued, predictability gives the appearance of equal treatment, 
suggests certainty about what the law requires, and imposes constraints on the power of 
officials. See Scalia, supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 87. An even closer look reveals that administrability is multifaceted and that these 
different facets implicate a variety of different values. For example, Professor Douglas Kahn has 
pointed out the “huge administrative difficulties” that would attend attempts to tax “an 
exchange of services performed in a marital community.” Douglas A. Kahn, Exclusion from 
Income of Compensation for Services and Pooling of Labor Occurring in a Noncommercial 
Setting, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 683, 687 (2011). Some of these—what Professor Kahn identifies as 
“valuation issues” and the difficulty of “discover[ing] the events where one spouse performed a 
service for the other”—have to do with simplicity, predictability, and ease of application. Id. 
Others implicate the “highly personal nature” of the services performed such that attempts to 
tax those services would threaten “an invasion of privacy and an intrusion into an individual’s 
private noncommercial life, and that would be unacceptable in a free society.” Id. at 687–88. 
Such an untoward intrusion into taxpayers’ private lives would be problematical on its own. It 
would also likely generate resistance and thereby undermine the operation of the tax system.  
Similarly, consider the example of attempting to tax the fair market value of a caught 
baseball. Here, administrability would be undermined by resistance caused by disrespect for the 
important role of baseball in American culture, see CHARLES O. ROSSOTTI, MANY UNHAPPY 
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transcendent law values, leaving it, as we argue in the next section, to 
the interpreters of the law to decide whether a given provision should 
be interpreted as a rule or a standard. 
B. Who Decides? 
The core of our claim is that nothing intrinsic to the Code 
demands that we read its provisions as rules (or as standards). As 
argued above, competing considerations present us with the choice, 
and the choice is part of interpreting the Code. Hence, a crucial 
question arises: Who has interpretive authority? More simply, who 
decides? 
Inevitably, Treasury and the IRS must initially interpret the 
Code. Treasury has long had the authority to issue regulations 
interpreting the Code,88 which were entitled to deference even before 
the Supreme Court held that Treasury’s tax regulations are entitled to 
Chevron deference.89 Moreover, the Court has explicitly recognized 
“the primary authority of the IRS and its predecessors in construing 
the Internal Revenue Code,”90 explaining that 
Congress, the source of IRS authority, can modify IRS rulings it 
considers improper; and courts exercise review over IRS actions. In 
the first instance, however, the responsibility for construing the 
Code falls to the IRS. Since Congress cannot be expected to 
 
RETURNS 95 (2005) (noting the observation by White House spokesman, Mike McCurry, that 
taxing Mark McGwire’s seventieth homerun baseball was “about the dumbest thing I’ve ever 
heard in my life”), and by the impracticality of taxing each of the hundreds of thousands of 
baseballs retrieved by fans each season, many of which (unlike McGwire’s record-breaking 
homerun ball) have a vanishingly low fair market value, but at least some of which may 
nevertheless have an ascertainable fair market value. And this is only the tip of the 
administrability iceberg. Although we believe teasing out the constituent parts of 
administrability is important to our project given the prominence of that concept in our 
interpretive analysis, its precise contours are not directly related to the thesis of this article. We 
will therefore refer generally to administrability in the text of this article without specifying the 
particular way in which administrability is implicated. 
 88. See I.R.C. § 7805 (2012). 
 89. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). As 
between agency and judicial interpretations of the Code, Treasury’s interpretations are entitled 
to strong deference from the courts. See id., applying the deference required by Chevron U.S.A. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to a Treasury regulation interpreting a 
provision of the Internal Revenue Code. Whether Chevron deference only applies to 
Regulations promulgated after notice and comment and not to less formal promulgations of 
rules and policies (e.g., temporary Treasury regulations and IRB guidance), is a matter of 
current debate. See generally Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 465 (2013) (discussing this point). 
 90. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983). 
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anticipate every conceivable problem that can arise or to carry out 
day-to-day oversight, it relies on the administrators and on the 
courts to implement the legislative will. Administrators, like judges, 
are under oath to do so.91 
As the Court observed, Congress can always determine the issue 
by legislation—whether the IRS’s initial position is pro-taxpayer or 
not.92 If Congress does not act, then a pro-taxpayer agency 
determination remains because, as Professor Zelenak points out, no 
one has standing to challenge it. Because interpretive authority is 
shared among Treasury, the IRS, the courts, and Congress, no branch 
necessarily has the final say. Rather, interpretation of the Code can 
more resemble a conversation among the branches. 
Consider the story of Evelyn Gregory. Mrs. Gregory owned all 
of the stock of Monitor Securities Corporation. Monitor owned stock 
in United Mortgage Corporation. A buyer wanted to buy the stock in 
United Mortgage but the sale would have generated a large gain to 
Monitor, subject to the corporate income tax. So Monitor did not sell. 
Instead, Monitor transferred the stock of United Mortgage to a newly 
formed corporation, Averill, and Averill issued all of its shares to 
Mrs. Gregory. Averill then liquidated, distributing its only asset, the 
United Mortgage stock, to Mrs. Gregory. That transaction did not 
attract a tax at the corporate level, but it was taxable to Mrs. Gregory 
and resulted in the United Mortgage stock having a basis (in Mrs. 
Gregory’s hands) equal to its fair market value. Mrs. Gregory then 
sold the United Mortgage stock to the buyer (at its fair market value), 
resulting in no additional gain or tax. At the end of the transaction, 
two important things had occurred: (1) Mrs. Gregory had the cash 
received from the buyer, and (2) there had only been one level of tax 
imposed on the gain, at capital gains rates to Mrs. Gregory. Had 
Monitor made the sale directly, there would have been a tax at the 
corporate level to Monitor, and when Monitor distributed the cash to 
Mrs. Gregory, she would have had to pay a tax on that dividend at 
ordinary income rates. 
Mrs. Gregory took the position that Monitor and Averill 
engaged in a reorganization. The statute provided that a 
 
 91. Id. at 596–97.  
 92. This is illustrated by the recent section 382 saga recounted by Professor Zelenak, in 
which Congress did not agree with a pro-taxpayer position and reacted accordingly, overruling 
the agency’s position by legislation. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 845–48; infra notes 130–45 and 
accompanying text. 
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reorganization was “a transfer by a corporation of . . . a part of its 
assets to another corporation if immediately [thereafter] . . . the 
transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation 
to which the assets are transferred.”93 The IRS disagreed with Mrs. 
Gregory’s position. It argued that “the creation of the Averill 
corporation was without substance and must therefore be 
disregarded”94 and therefore, that Averill was not a corporation and 
Monitor’s transfer of United Mortgage stock was not “a transfer by a 
corporation . . . to another corporation.”95 The Board of Tax Appeals 
rejected that argument. Mrs. Gregory won. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the Board that Averill 
was a corporation and that the transaction meets the “dictionary 
definitions of each term used in the statutory definition [of a 
reorganization].”96 Nevertheless, Mrs. Gregory lost. Despite the literal 
compliance with the words of the statute, Judge Learned Hand 
explained, 
[I]t does not follow that Congress meant to cover such a transaction, 
not even though the facts answer the dictionary definitions of each 
term used in the statutory definition. It is quite true, as the Board 
has very well said, that as the articulation of a statute increases, the 
room for interpretation must contract; but the meaning of a 
sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody 
is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever 
obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all 
collectively create.97 
The court held that there was no reorganization “because the 
transactions were no part of the conduct of the business of either or 
both companies; so viewed they were a sham, though all the 
proceedings had their usual effect.”98 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s judgment, 
holding that literal compliance with the Code is not necessarily 
sufficient. The purported reorganization was a “mere device”99—an 
 
 93. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(i)(1)(B), 45 Stat. 791, 818. 
 94. Gregory v. Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 223, 224 (1932). 
 95. Revenue Act of 1928, § 112(i)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
 96. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).  
 97. Id. at 810–11. 
 98. Id. at 811. 
 99. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). 
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“elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a 
corporate reorganization, and nothing else.”100 
The Gregory litigation revealed that Congress had not said 
enough, so Congress said more. Eventually the very language the 
Supreme Court used to deny tax-free status to a “mere device” 
became a part of the statute.101 The administrative agency further 
interpreted it by issuing regulations to identify such “mere devices.”102 
The Gregory litigation and its aftermath illustrate the interaction 
among the three branches of government in the interpretation of the 
Code. The administrators are the first-order interpreters, either 
through litigation or the issuance of guidance, but their interpretation 
is neither the first nor last word on the subject. 
For our purposes, the more fundamental point of the Gregory 
saga is this: It has never seemed remarkable to characterize what the 
IRS and the courts did in Gregory as interpretation, even though the 
statutory provision contained an explicit definition of 
“reorganization.” Likewise, it has not seemed remarkable that the 
IRS interpreted the word “income” to include punitive damages or 
meals and lodging provided by an employer or many other things. 
Indeed, if the term “reorganization,” which has an explicit definition 
in the statute, can be interpreted not to encompass transactions that 
satisfy all the “steps” set out in the statute,103 then the term “income,” 
which contains no such highly articulated definition, must perforce be 
susceptible of interpretation. Our claim is that the IRS’s decision not 
to treat employee-retained frequent flyer miles or caught baseballs as 
income is as much an interpretation as its decision to treat punitive 
damages or meals and lodging as income, or what Mrs. Gregory did as 
not a reorganization.104 The only difference is that the former 
decisions are pro-taxpayer, whereas the latter is anti-taxpayer. 
 
 100. Id. at 470. 
 101. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 102. The regulations provide that whether a transaction is a device depends on 
all the facts and circumstances, including, but not limited to, the presence of the 
device factors specified in paragraph (d)(2) of this section . . . , and the presence of 
the nondevice factors, specified in paragraph (d)(3) of this section . . . . However, if a 
transaction is specified in paragraph (d)(5) of this section, then it is ordinarily 
considered not to have been used principally as a device. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(1).  
 103. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 104. Although we take this subject up directly elsewhere, we believe that the rule/standard 
analysis explains IRS interpretations outside of the definition of income, including 
interpretations in corporate taxation. For example, it seems to us that the rule/standard analysis 
explains why the IRS has taken the position that family hostility should not be taken into 
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As Professor Zelenak points out, a pro-taxpayer interpretation 
will usually be invulnerable to challenge. But whether the taxpayer or 
the government benefits from the interpretation does not affect its 
character as an interpretation.105 For example, if the IRS decides that 
 
account in applying the attribution provisions of section 318, (“the facts and circumstances of a 
particular case cannot contradict the mechanical determination under section 318 of how much 
stock a shareholder owns.”) Rev. Rul. 80-26, 1980-1 C.B. 66. The IRS position treats section 318 
as a rule and doing so respects the dominance of the value of administrability that the provision 
was designed to promote. Not surprisingly, the courts have been sharply divided. Compare 
David Metzger Trust v. Comm’r, 693 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding family hostility does not 
prevent the application of the attribution rules), Cerone v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1 (1986) (finding 
family hostility irrelevant), Robin Haft Trust v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 398 (1973) (finding family 
hostility irrelevant), with Robin Haft Trust v. Comm’r, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975) (taking family 
hostility into account), rev’g 61 T.C. 398 (1973), Rodgers P. Johnson Trust v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 
941 (1979) (hostility taken into account), Estate of Squier v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 950 (1961) (taking 
hostility into account), acq. 1961-2 C.B. 5, acq. withdrawn and nonacq. substituted 1978-2 C.B. 
4). Similarly, the pro-taxpayer results in Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670 (1st 
Cir. 1956) and George L. Riggs, Inc. v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 474 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 2, are 
easily understood as following from the judicial interpretation of section 332 as a rule (and the 
rejection of the IRS’s attempted interpretation as a standard). Rev. Rul. 75-521, 1975-2 C.B. 
120, shows that the IRS now agrees with that judicial interpretation. Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 
531 U.S. 206 (2001), also presented an interpretive dispute, with both sides arguing that the 
‘plain meaning’ of section 108(d)(7)(A) supported their desired result, but the IRS (and Justice 
Breyer, in dissent) actually advocated a reading that had the virtue of “closing a loophole” and 
in effect advocated a more standard-like construction. Gitlitz also provides an example of the 
dynamic nature of interpretation, as Congress subsequently weighed in, amending section 
108(d)(7)(A) to legislatively reverse Gitlitz. Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21 (2002). The so-called INDOPCO regulations can easily be seen as 
revealing Treasury’s decision to interpret the term capitalization as setting forth a standard 
within which safe harbor and de minimis rules provide some certainty; the iconic term “earnings 
and profits” used in section 316 to define a dividend has no statutory definition and judicial 
opinions have interpreted it as a standard, which appropriately allows the term to develop as 
corporate finance and accounting evolve. See Bangor & Aroostoock R.R. v. Comm’r, 193 F.2d 
827 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952). 
 105. We agree that this is often the case, but of course, exceptions exist. For example, many 
assumed that the Check-the-Box regulations would be invulnerable to challenge when they 
became effective in January 1997 because their position was so pro-taxpayer. This assumption 
proved false when taxpayers argued in subsequent litigation that in issuing the regulations, the 
Treasury exceeded its authority to issue interpretive regulations. In Littriello v. United States, 
Mr. Littriello was the sole member of an LLC that had not made an election under the Check-
the-Box regulations to be treated as a corporation. 484 F.3d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 2007). Under the 
Check-the-Box regulations, this made Mr. Littriello’s LLC a disregarded entity and subject to 
pass-through taxation. As a result, the IRS argued that when the LLC failed to pay the required 
withholding and FICA taxes, Mr. Littriello was personally liable for those deficiencies. Id. Mr. 
Littriello argued that the regulations were invalid and therefore the taxes could not be imposed 
upon him, but the IRS won. Id. Since Littriello, the regulations’ validity has repeatedly been 
upheld in analogous cases. See, e.g., McNamee v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 
2007); Med. Practice Solutions, LLC v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 125 (2009), aff’d sub nom.; Britton v. 
Comm’r, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19925 (1st Cir. 2010); Stearn & Co., LLC v. United States, 499 
F. Supp. 2d 899 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
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employee-retained frequent-flier miles are not income (a pro-
taxpayer result), it will be engaging in interpretation just as it did 
when it decided that punitive damages are income (an anti-taxpayer 
result). Whether an interpretation is pro- or anti-taxpayer is 
independent of the act of interpretation. And even when the IRS 
reaches a pro-taxpayer conclusion, Congress can weigh in, as it did 
following the various section 382 Notices, which Professor Zelenak 
describes, and which are discussed in Part IV. 
IV.  THE VARIETIES OF INTERPRETATION 
In Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the 
Income Tax,106 Professor Zelenak identifies what he describes as “the 
phenomenon of administratively created customary deviations from 
the dictates of the Internal Revenue Code.”107 He distinguishes 
customary deviations from three other phenomena that produce the 
conclusion that certain accessions to wealth are not treated as income: 
interpretations central to the “structure of the income tax,”108 
“dubious protaxpayer interpretations,”109 and “mere 
underenforcement.”110 He treats these conclusions as justifiable 
exceptions to a general requirement that income be strictly 
interpreted as a rule. 
In Section A, we show that if we interpret income as a standard, 
then the accessions discussed by Professor Zelenak are simply not 
income, and there is no need to treat them as exceptions, which 
nothing in the Code authorizes. In Section B, we move beyond the 
definition of income to further clarify our approach to interpreting 
the Code. We consider a dramatic example of an improper 
interpretation: Notice 2008-83, which was issued by the IRS to give 
guidance on the application of section 382 of the Code to banks 
during the financial crisis. Both Professor Zelenak and we agree that 
the Notice incorrectly interpreted section 382; we disagree, however, 
with respect to why the interpretation was incorrect. 
 
 106. Zelenak, supra note 1. 
 107. Id. at 832. 
 108. Id. at 834. 
 109. Id. at 832. 
 110. Id. 
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A. Structural Interpretations, Dubious Interpretations, and 
Underenforcement 
The first phenomenon that Professor Zelenak distinguishes from 
customary deviations is what he refers to as “a protaxpayer 
interpretation of the Code that may seem dubious or even 
insupportable in terms of the literal language of the Code, but which 
would almost certainly be adopted by the courts if the IRS were to 
reverse its position and taxpayers were to challenge the new IRS 
position.”111 Professor Zelenak’s prime example is the “exclusion from 
gross income of imputed income from services (that is, the value of 
services one performs for oneself) and from property (that is, the 
rental value of owner-occupied housing and consumer durables).”112 
His justification is that “[t]he exclusion of such benefits dates from 
the dawn of the income tax and is so central to the structure of the 
income tax that it is inconceivable that the courts would support an 
administrative effort to reverse that exclusion.”113 
Professor Zelenak is not alone in concluding that imputed 
income is not income—almost all commentators would agree,114 as do 
we—but we take issue with the assumption that imputed income 
should be thought of as an exclusion rather than as something that is 
not income at all within the meaning of section 61. Construing section 
61 as a rule leads to that conclusion because it arguably brings within 
section 61 all accessions, including imputed income and even leisure 
 
 111. Id. at 833. 
 112. Id. at 834. 
 113. Id. 
 114. In a widely cited piece, Professor Donald B. Marsh suggests that imputed income is not 
income so as to “balance the exemption of leisure income and thus to restore in a measure the 
balance between work and leisure as alternative ways of using one’s time.” Donald B. Marsh, 
The Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 514, 520 (1943). He notes that because it 
would be nearly impossible and impractical for the government to attempt to tax our leisure 
activities, the government must, in the name of equity, exempt imputed income from taxation. 
Id. Professor Dodge also agrees that imputed income does not constitute income because in his 
view, imputed income does not represent an accession to wealth. Joseph M. Dodge, Accessions 
to Wealth, Realization of Gross Income, and Dominion and Control: Applying the “Claim of 
Right Doctrine” to Found Objects, Including Record-Setting Baseballs, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 685, 688 
(2000). For a graphic and recent illustration of the administrative difficulties of taxing imputed 
income, including managing public outrage and incomprehension, see Bruce Bartlett, Taxing 
Homeowners as if They Were Landlords, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Sept. 3, 2013, 12:01 
AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/taxing-homeowners-as-if-they-were-
landlords (note especially the blogged reactions to Bartlett’s discussion of the concept). See also 
Bruce Bartlett, Taxing Medicare Benefits, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Sept. 17, 2013, 12:01 
AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/taxing-medicare-benefits (providing 
additional discussion on these administrative difficulties). 
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and psychic benefits. But our project has been to question why that is 
the only or even the best construction of section 61. Construing 
section 61 as setting forth a standard to be determined after 
consideration of the relevant values produces a better, more 
transparent result than assuming the definition of income is an all-
inclusive rule: if it is a rule, the only way that imputed income is not 
income is to exclude it, but no statutory authority for such an 
exclusion exists.115 Construing section 61 as a standard, which permits 
consideration of important tax values like administrability, provides 
an explanation for the nontaxation of imputed income and thereby 
avoids the need to distinguish it from employee-retained frequent 
flyer miles. Under our construction, both items are not income as a 
matter of interpretation by the agency charged with interpreting the 
Code. They are the same in that neither is income as that term is 
interpreted when it is viewed as a standard. 
Professor Zelenak describes the second category as “mere 
dubious protaxpayer interpretations of the Code by the Treasury 
Department or the IRS.”116 His example here is a set of 
proposed regulations issued in 1992, which would have extended the 
exclusion of I.R.C. § 101(a) for life-insurance proceeds ‘paid by 
reason of the death of the insured’ to ‘qualified accelerated death 
benefits’ that are paid by an insurer to a terminally ill insured within 
twelve months of the expected death of the insured.117 
Professor Zelenak distinguishes items in this category from 
customary deviations in that these items purport to be the result of 
interpretations (however erroneous they might be), while in the case 
of customary deviations, the IRS is “simply conceding that it has no 
intention to enforce the law . . . .”118 
Professor Zelenak’s discussion of section 101(a) suggests that 
interpretation depends on ambiguity. For him, “by reason of the 
death of the insured”119 is sufficiently ambiguous to leave room for 
 
 115. We assume that Professor Zelenak would put government transfer payments, which the 
IRS has announced are not income under the general welfare doctrine (see Abreu & 
Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 4, at 308 n.50; Notice 99-3, 1999-1 C.B. 271), such as 
Medicare and Medicaid, into this category as well, and not classify them as customary 
deviations. 
 116. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 835. 
 117. Id. (citation omitted).  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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interpretation, and while the interpretation reflected in the proposed 
regulations might be “dubious,” he believes that it is nonetheless 
interpretation because the ambiguity of section 101(a) of the Code 
permits it. By contrast, Professor Zelenak takes section 61(a) to be 
unambiguous and thus capable of being directly applied “as written.” 
For all the reasons we discussed earlier, including the voluminous 
litigation required to define income, we disagree. If we are correct 
that the term “income” demands continual consideration and 
interpretation, then customary deviations are interpretations.120 
More fundamentally, the ambiguity of a Code provision is not 
the beginning of the analysis; rather it is part of the conclusion 
reached when interpreting text. And because texts can be interpreted 
differently, analysts can disagree about whether the text is 
ambiguous. For example, it seems to us that Professor Zelenak 
believes that the term “income” is unambiguous and, therefore, not 
subject to interpretation; we disagree. By contrast, Professor Zelenak 
appears willing to accept that section 101(a) is ambiguous and, 
therefore, subject to interpretation, as former IRS Commissioner 
Fred Goldberg and also former ABA Tax Section Chair James 
Holden believed, although Professor Zelenak is troubled by the 
interpretation made by Treasury.121 In this case it is Lee Sheppard 
who disagrees: for her, “death” is unambiguous and not subject to 
interpretation.122 
We do not claim that Professor Zelenak is being inconsistent in 
finding ambiguity in one term and not in the other. Rather, we 
 
 120. Perhaps the following thought experiment will help to illuminate this point. Imagine a 
regulation that took the position that employee-retained frequent flyer miles were not income. 
Given the voluminous and sometimes contradictory history of litigation regarding the scope of 
section 61(a), it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would find the regulation invalid on the 
ground that the meaning of the term is unambiguous. (And despite the difficulty of challenging 
a generally pro-taxpayer position it could be the case that a given taxpayer wanted income so as 
to qualify for a greater tax benefit, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, assuming the income 
would qualify as earned income.) By contrast, it is difficult to imagine that the Court would 
uphold a regulation that provided that banks were not corporations to which section 382 is 
applicable. 
 121. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 835 n.25 and accompanying text (“[T]he section 101(a) 
exclusion for payments ‘by reason of the death of the insured’ is broad enough to permit 
payments made by reason of imminent death . . . .” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)). 
 122. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 835 (noting that “a prominent commentator sharply criticized 
the proposed regulations as irreconcilable with the statutory language”). Professor Zelenak was 
referring to Lee Sheppard’s observation that “‘[b]y reason of the death of the insured’ means 
what it says—death.” Id. at 835 n.24 (citation omitted). Congress subsequently amended section 
101 to essentially codify Commissioner Goldberg’s interpretation. See I.R.C. § 101(g) (2012). 
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believe he is reaching different interpretive conclusions about 
different provisions. And that is the point: Ambiguity is not an 
intrinsic quality of a statutory text.123 Rather, ambiguity emerges from 
context and use. For example, in the recent Mayo case, the Supreme 
Court confronted the question whether the statutory term “student” 
is ambiguous.124 The Court considered the particular context of 
medical residency and concluded that in that context the meaning of 
the term “student” was ambiguous. In many ordinary contexts, the 
meaning of “student” is unambiguous and uncontroversial. But the 
word does not define itself, and the Court could not apply the Code 
“as written.” 
The third category is what Professor Zelenak characterizes as 
“simple underenforcement of the law without any indication (beyond 
the mere underenforcement) that the IRS acquiesces in widespread 
noncompliance with the Code.”125 His example is the 8 percent 
requirement for information reporting of tip income.126 While we 
claim that the items in Professor Zelenak’s first two categories result 
from interpreting the definition of income as a standard, we agree 
that underenforcement is completely different from interpretation. 
We also agree that fully or partially failing to require the payment of 
tax on a category of items that the IRS knows are income because it 
chooses to allocate its enforcement resources to other matters is 
different from treating the items as not income at all. 
Still, it bears pointing out that the reasons for underenforcement 
must relate either to the values that define the field of tax law or to 
values relevant to the exercise of enforcement discretion in any field 
of law. As a recent controversy demonstrates, focusing tax 
enforcement efforts on a particular political group assumed to be 
disfavored by the current Administration is unacceptable.127 And the 
 
 123. That is not to say that interpretations cannot be criticized as better or worse, just as Lee 
Sheppard criticizes Treasury’s interpretation of “by reason of the death of the insured” as 
mistaken. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 835 n.24. 
 124. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 710 (2011). 
 125. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 834. 
 126. I.R.C. § 6053(a), (c)(3)(A), (c)(4) (2012); Zelenak, supra note 1, at 834; see also United 
States v. Fior d’Italia, Inc., 536 U.S. 238, 240 (2002) (allowing the IRS to estimate aggregate tips 
received by restaurant employees when assessing FICA taxes on unreported tips due from the 
restaurant rather than estimating each individual employee’s tip income). 
 127. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, Inappropriate 
Criteria Were Used to Identify Tax-Exempt Applications for Review, 2013-10-053, at 5–9 (May 
14, 2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf. In 
mid-2013, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration reported that in considering 
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straightforward reason is that such politically motivated action, if it 
occurred, would find no support in the values that animate federal tax 
law or, more generally, the exercise of enforcement discretion. By 
contrast, the practice that Professor Zelenak points to—that “the IRS 
is content to enforce the income tax on . . . tips subject to information 
reporting [requiring an allocation of 8 percent of gross receipts to 
certain tipped employees], without making a serious effort with 
respect to the other half (roughly speaking) of actual tip income”128—
serves the relevant tax value of administrability.129 While some tax 
values (e.g., horizontal equity) might be sacrificed, the tradeoff 
between accuracy and administrability can be plausibly accounted for 
within the universe of relevant values. In this respect the IRS is not 
acting in a way that differs materially from that of other 
administrative agencies that routinely exercise “prosecutorial 
discretion.” In sum, we agree with Professor Zelenak that what he 
terms underenforcement is fundamentally different from 
interpretation. 
B. Interpretation and the Story of the Section 382 Guidance 
An interpretation of the Code is an understanding of the 
provision that can be justified by tax values. Whether it is correct or 
incorrect is determined by its fate: A correct interpretation is one that 
has achieved widespread (albeit provisional, or contingent), 
acceptance. Conversely, an incorrect interpretation is one that is 
 
applications for tax-exempt status, “the IRS used inappropriate criteria that identified for 
review Tea Party and other organizations . . . based upon their names or policy positions instead 
of indications of potential political campaign intervention.” Id. at 2. The result was widespread 
public condemnation of the IRS and calls for firings, further investigations, and legal action. 
While this summary of the “scandal” is merely just that, a summary, and not to be construed as 
our beliefs on the matter, we do want to note in agreement that such a scandal could certainly 
weaken the public’s trust in the impartiality expected from the IRS. 
 128. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 834; I.R.C. § 6053(a), (c)(3)(A), (c)(4) (2012); see also United 
States v. Fior d’Italia, Inc., 536 U.S. 238, 240 (2002) (allowing the IRS to estimate aggregate tips 
received by restaurant employees when assessing FICA taxes on unreported tips due from the 
restaurant rather than estimating each individual employee’s tip income).  
 129. This observation does not depend on assumptions about people wanting to cheat. It is 
simply unrealistic to expect that either employers or employees will be able to reliably and 
consistently maintain the detailed records of ad hoc tips required to accurately calculate and 
report this income. Adjusting IRS practice to such realities is a critical part of serving the value 
of administrability. 
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foreclosed by some combination of congressional direction, relevant 
judicial decisions, history, and tradition.130 
The holdings of Gregory identify both correct and incorrect 
interpretations of the Code proffered by the IRS. The correct 
interpretation is the familiar one described above: literal compliance 
with the terms of the Code does not suffice to make a transaction a 
reorganization. But in the very same case the IRS offered an incorrect 
interpretation of the statutory term, “corporation.” The IRS argued 
that whether an entity was a corporation is to be measured by a 
standard pursuant to which an entity incorporated under state law 
would not be a corporation for tax purposes if it was incorporated to 
avoid income tax. The government sought to treat such an entity as a 
sham, but that argument was soundly rejected by the Board of Tax 
Appeals and later by Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second 
Circuit, as well as by the Supreme Court.131 It has also been 
consistently rejected by many other courts.132 
It is important to see that the IRS’s reading of “corporation” was 
an interpretation, even if incorrect, because it was justified in terms of 
the tax value of substance over form; the IRS sought to disregard 
corporations that were formed exclusively for the purpose of tax 
avoidance. The correct interpretation of “reorganization” was also 
grounded in tax values—again, the value of having tax follow 
economics so that particular tax consequences obtain only when a 
transaction is economically significant, i.e., when it has economic 
 
 130. The account of correct and incorrect interpretation in this subpart summarizes a more 
detailed discussion in Richard K. Greenstein’s Toward a Jurisprudence of Social Values, supra 
note 30, at 9–12. 
 131. The Supreme Court confirmed that “[n]o doubt, a new and valid corporation was 
created.” Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1935). 
 132. See, e.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm’r, 115 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[A] 
corporation and the form of its transactions are recognizable for tax purposes, despite any tax-
avoidance motive, so long as the corporation engages in bona fide economically-based business 
transactions.”); Weekend Warrior Trailers, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2011-105 (2011) 
(“Even if a corporation was not formed for a valid business purpose, it nevertheless must be 
respected for tax purposes if it actually engaged in business activity.”); Aiken Indus., Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 56 T.C. 925, 933 (1971) (“[W]hile we agree with the petitioner that Industrias was a 
‘corporation’ for purposes of article IX, and that it therefore cannot be disregarded, we do not 
agree with the petitioner’s conclusion that this factor alone was sufficient to qualify the interest 
in question for the exemption from taxation granted by article IX. Rather, we must determine 
whether the transaction in question conforms to the other requirements established by article 
IX.”). 
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effects outside of tax.133 What made the IRS’s interpretation of 
reorganization correct and its interpretation of corporation incorrect 
was how the interpretations were received—i.e., which among the 
variety of relevant tax values the courts saw as most important. In the 
case of the definition of a corporation, the tax value of 
administrability was taken to be more important than the value of 
substance. Accordingly, courts have consistently refused to interpret 
“corporation” as a standard and have not required taxpayers to 
demonstrate a business purpose for corporate formation. Indeed, 
today the classification is even elective.134 All this demonstrates that 
the interpretation of “corporation” as a standard lacks widespread 
acceptance and, for this reason, can be said to be incorrect. By 
contrast, the interpretation of “reorganization” as requiring more 
than literal compliance with the text of the Code has achieved 
widespread acceptance, thus establishing that interpretation as 
correct. 
But sometimes an application of the Code cannot plausibly be 
justified in terms of any tax values at all. Consider the story of the 
section 382 guidance, discussed by Professor Zelenak. As he 
succinctly explains: 
Section 382 of the Code imposes strict limits on the deductibility of 
corporate net-operating-loss carryforwards and of unrealized built-
in losses, following either an acquisition of a loss corporation by 
another corporation or a major change in the ownership of a loss 
corporation. In September 2008, as Congress was considering a 
massive bailout bill for the financial industry, the IRS of the Bush 
administration made its own contribution to the bailout effort by 
issuing Notice 2008-83, declaring—without making any attempt to 
explain or justify its conclusion—that the § 382 limitations on the 
use of built-in losses following an ownership change would no longer 
apply to banks. The primary purpose of the notice appears to have 
been the facilitation of the acquisition of failing Wachovia—by 
Wells Fargo, as it turned out. Although the notice generated 
considerable outrage in the media, among tax experts, and on 
Capitol Hill, it achieved the desired result. Early in 2009, Congress 
took the highly unusual step of enacting legislation specifically 
disapproving of Notice 2008-83 as “inconsistent with the 
congressional intent” and describing the legal authority for the 
 
 133. This concept is now codified in § 7701(o) to include both the existence of an economic 
(non-tax) effect and a business purpose. See I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2012).  
 134. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2006).  
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notice as “doubtful.” The legislation, however, also declared that 
taxpayers could rely on the notice with respect to ownership changes 
occurring before January 17, 2009.135 
Professor Zelenak, like many tax experts and Congress, believes 
that Notice 2008-83 is not only not a correct interpretation of the 
Code, but that it is not an interpretation at all. We agree, but for a 
different reason. Whereas Professor Zelenak believes that Notice 
2008-83 is not an interpretation because it disregards the Code “as 
written,” we believe that the Notice is not an interpretation because it 
is not grounded in relevant tax values. 
Section 382 as originally enacted in 1954 was a direct response to 
the difficulty of policing trafficking in loss corporations with only 
section 269, which permits the disallowance of tax benefits for 
transactions made for the “principal purpose . . . [of] evasion or 
avoidance of Federal income tax”136 and has been consistently 
interpreted as a standard. By contrast to section 269, section 382 as 
enacted in 1954 provided detailed criteria which denied the deduction 
of a net operating loss if certain changes in the ownership of the 
corporation occurred between the time that the loss was incurred and 
 
 135. Congress limited the effect of Notice 2008-83 in the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261(a), 123 Stat. 115, 342–43 (2009) 
(finding that the IRS lacked authority to exempt “particular industries or classes of taxpayers” 
from section 382 and that the exemption in Notice 2008-83 was “inconsistent with the 
congressional intent” with regard to section 382). 
 136. I.R.C. § 269(a) (2012). As Bittker and Eustice explain: 
  On the ground that § 269 had proved to be ineffectual as a weapon against the 
traffic in loss corporations because it had required proof that tax avoidance was the 
primary purpose of the transaction, in 1954 Congress enacted two new restrictions on 
the net operating loss carryover. The first was § 382(a), applicable to changes of 
ownership through the purchase of stock, which provided for the complete 
disallowance of the carryover if, roughly speaking, 50 percent of the corporation’s 
stock changed hands by purchase in a two-year period and the corporation’s old trade 
or business was discontinued. The business-continuity requirement of § 382(a) 
presented many factual difficulties and resulted in extensive litigation, with often 
conflicting opinions that were difficult to reconcile. The second restriction was § 
382(b), applicable only to changes of ownership to a tax-free reorganization, under 
which the carryover was reduced proportionately if the old owners received less than 
20 percent of the stock of the reorganized corporation (and was totally eliminated if 
they received no stock). Neither restriction was dependent upon a showing of tax-
avoidance purpose; the function of both restrictions was to reduce or eliminate the 
carryover in appropriate cases even though the transactions could not be brought 
within the scope of § 269. 
  Desiring to combine the bifurcated approach of § 382 into a single regime and to 
clear up various uncertainties, including especially the business-continuity test, 
Congress amended § 382 in 1976.  
 BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 
AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 14.42[1] (2012). The 1976 amendments had a delayed effective date and 
were eventually supplanted by the 1986 amendments, without ever having come into effect. Id. 
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the time the deduction was to be taken. Subsequent amendments 
refined the criteria and operation of the provision.137 Resort to motive 
was abandoned and replaced by mathematically ascertainable 
metrics. 
The revisions to section 382 demonstrate the congressional 
desire to move from judicial doctrines and statutory provisions whose 
application depends on specific facts and circumstances to an 
administrable, if very complicated, rule.138 Indeed, when it adopted 
the current version of section 382 in 1986, Congress made plain its 
intent to supplant a standard with determinable rules.139 
As Professors Bittker and Eustice explain, the history of section 
382 makes it clear that the provision was designed 
(1) to provide for tax neutrality on the disposition of corporations 
that possess favorable tax carryover characteristics (i.e., to eliminate 
both incentives and disincentives for the acquisition); (2) to limit the 
use of corporate tax benefits generated under one set of owners to 
the income attributable to the particular pool of capital that 
generated those benefits; and (3) to provide objective rules that 
could be applied and administered with greater certainty. With the 
 
 137. Prior to the 2008 Notice the most recent amendments had been enacted in 1986. The 
1986 amendments were the only ones to take effect after section 382 was originally enacted. Id. 
¶ 14.42[1]. Section 382 was first amended in 1976 to clarify the business continuity test and other 
uncertainties, but delays to the effective date of these changes ultimately prevented their 
implementation before the 1986 rewrite. Id. 
 138. See, e.g., Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957). See also BITTKER & 
EUSTICE, supra note 136, ¶ 14.42, for a discussion of the original section 382, the enacted but 
delayed 1976 amendments, and the ultimate adoption of the current version of section 382 in 
1986. 
 139. The Conference Report specifically states that the conferees intended “that the Libson 
Shops doctrine will have no application to transactions subject to the provisions of the 
conference agreement.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-841 pt. 2, at 194 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4282. Libson Shops denied the use of net operating losses following a 
merger under the provisions applicable before enactment of the 1954 Code. Libson Shops, 353 
U.S. at 390. It was the uncertainty created by the standards-based facts and circumstances 
analysis represented by Libson Shops and similar cases that provided the impetus for the 
enactment of the first section 382 in 1954. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 136, ¶ 14.46[2]. 
Commentators understood this and cheered, with Bittker and Eustice almost gleefully declaring 
that in the 1986 revision of section 382, “the Libson Shops doctrine was finally interred.” Id. ¶ 
14.42[2]. Moreover, in affirming the continuing application of section 269 to the net operating 
loss carryover provisions, Congress allowed the IRS to use the standards-based approach of that 
provision to protect the fisc when appropriate while fostering administrability in most cases 
through the enactment of clear, if complicated, rules. 
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exception of a modification to the pool of capital approach, these 
objectives were clearly evident in the final version of § 382.140 
Interpreting section 382 through the lens of this history would 
have precluded the deduction by Wells Fargo of losses incurred by 
Wachovia. By concluding that section 382 would not apply to banks, 
Notice 2008-83 permitted those deductions, and made Wells Fargo’s 
acquisition of Wachovia more attractive; the ability to deduct 
Wachovia’s losses reduced the cost of the acquisition. The Notice 
thereby encouraged the very trafficking in loss corporations that 
section 382 was intended to discourage and prevent.141 Hence, the 
position in the Notice—exempting banks from inclusion in the term 
“corporation”—not only is unsupported by relevant tax values but 
indeed contradicts them. Notice 2008-83 could not be an 
interpretation of section 382 at all. In this we agree with Professor 
Zelenak. 
But Professor Zelenak goes on to contend that: 
The recent § 382 notices should be troubling to anyone who values 
the application of the rule of law to tax administration. One can only 
speculate, but it is plausible that the § 382 notices never would have 
been issued but for the precedent of the § 61 customary deviations.142 
In this we disagree with Professor Zelenak. The conclusion that 
Notice 2008-83 is not an interpretation of section 382 does not require 
the further conclusion that it is an affront to the rule of law. Respect 
for the rule of law can be manifested by a variety of administrative 
actions. These actions include interpretation but also include proper 
exercises of enforcement discretion. Like a prosecutor exercising 
prosecutorial discretion, administrative agencies have the authority to 
decide whether and when to enforce the law.143 Just as a prosecutor 
can decide not to charge a defendant with a crime in order to serve 
the greater good (for example, by obtaining important information 
from the defendant in exchange for non-prosecution), so the IRS can 
decide not to apply a provision under circumstances where non-
 
 140. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 136, ¶ 14.42[2] (footnotes omitted). 
 141. This is the neutrality objective that was at the top of the list provided by Professors 
Bittker and Eustice and which case law and commentary clearly show to be the dominant 
motive behind restrictions on the deductibility of net operating losses following a change in 
control. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 136, ¶ 14.42[2]. 
 142. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 847. 
 143. See, e.g., Moog Indus. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 855 U.S. 411, 413–14 (1958); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 250 (1967). 
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application would also produce a greater good. In the case of Notice 
2008-83 we believe the IRS was doing precisely that: deciding that the 
greater good to the economy from facilitating the acquisition of a 
failing financial institution at a time of unexpected and severe 
financial crisis justified not applying section 382. 
In other words, if instead of thinking of Notice 2008-83 as an 
exercise of the IRS’s interpretive authority, we think of it as an 
exercise of the IRS’s enforcement discretion, the action can be 
viewed as legitimate.144 We are not saying that an exercise of 
enforcement discretion of this sort is necessarily uncontroversial; our 
point is that the exercise of enforcement discretion can be consistent 
with the rule of law. Accordingly, we think that the difference 
between what the IRS did in issuing Notice 2008-83 and what 
Professor Zelenak describes as permissible underenforcement with 
respect to reportable tips is one of degree, not one of kind. Both may 
be controversial and differ in the level of transparency with which 
they are communicated, but neither violates the rule of law.145 
CONCLUSION 
The Internal Revenue Code does not “read itself.”146 All 
applications of the Code require interpretation. It is, of course, 
 
 144. As Professor Zelenak also points out,  
  The Obama administration followed the Bush-era precedent, thus making pro-
taxpayer administrative revisions of § 382 a bipartisan activity. The Obama-era IRS 
issued several § 382 notices of its own, including, most prominently, Notice 2010-2, 
which declared—again, without apparent support from the statute—that § 382 would 
not be triggered if the Treasury Department were to sell its shares of General Motors 
to the public. Although the notice attracted some sharp criticism, it remains in effect.  
Zelenak, supra note 1, at 846 (footnotes omitted). Evaluating Notice 2010-2, 2010-1 C.B. 251, is 
less clear-cut than evaluating Notice 2008-83. The latter could not have been an interpretation; it 
could only have been an exercise in enforcement discretion. But Notice 2010-2 could be either. 
The reasons for this are that it implicates another statute besides the Code, (the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, P.L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765), the sui generis identity of the 
seller (the Federal Government, a non-taxpayer, to which section 382 could not have been 
intended to apply), the posture of the Notice as an announcement of the forthcoming issuance of 
regulations, and the existence of different provisions dealing with stock acquired in bankruptcy 
reorganizations (section 382(l)(5)). We will not engage in that analysis in this essay. However, 
we will take up the larger issue of distinguishing interpretation from enforcement discretion in a 
forthcoming article. 
 145. See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Stanley Fish, Consequences, 11 CRITICAL INQUIRY 433, 446 (1985) (“The semantic 
meaning of the text does not announce itself; it must be decided upon, that is, interpreted . . . . 
In short, no text reads itself . . . .”). See also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126 (2d ed. 
1994) (“[Rules do not] provide for their own interpretation. The plain case, where the general 
terms seem to need no interpretation and where the recognition of instances seems 
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possible to anchor the interpretation of section 61 in language, 
legislative history, or case law, and we do not deny that doing so is an 
appropriate interpretive technique. But nothing requires that 
interpretation stop with that. For instance, Learned Hand did not 
limit himself to consideration of statutory language, legislative 
history, or case law to conclude that what Mrs. Gregory did (which 
appeared to track the statutory language precisely) did not constitute 
a reorganization.147 He invoked purpose and context to reach this 
conclusion—also an appropriate interpretive technique. 
Given the requirement of interpretation, we have argued that the 
IRS necessarily has the initial responsibility for interpreting the Code, 
sometimes subject to judicial oversight and always subject to 
correction by Congress. Part of that interpretive responsibility 
permits Treasury, the IRS, and the courts (in the service of tax law’s 
values) to treat a Code provision as a rule or a standard. 
Some provisions of the Code are better interpreted as rules. For 
example, the IRS has interpreted the statutory terms “marriage,” 
“spouse,” “husband and wife,” “husband,” and “wife,” in accordance 
with a rule that defers to the place of celebration for determination.148 
This makes sense because it provides certainty and prevents 
government intrusion into very private relationships. On the other 
hand, in the Gregory litigation, the Second Circuit and the Supreme 
Court interpreted “reorganization” as a standard for all the reasons 
previously explained.149 
Although we agree that the use of rules can serve the rule of law, 
we believe that the use of standards is also fully consistent with the 
rule of law. The rule of law requires predictability. What gives 
predictability to decisionmaking within any field of law is the use of 
the values that define the field to interpret and apply its judicial 
doctrines, legislative provisions, and administrative regulations. The 
IRS’s treatment of the definition of gross income as a standard 
 
unproblematic or ‘automatic,’ are only the familiar ones, constantly recurring in similar 
contexts, where there is general agreement in judgments as to the applicability of the classifying 
terms.”); Richard K. Greenstein, Text as Tool: Why We Read the Law, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
105, 117 (1995) (“We read texts for many reasons . . . . The way that we use texts to achieve a 
particular purpose is to interpret the text—that is, to determine the text’s meaning. Just as any 
tool must be manipulated to be used, a text must be interpreted to be used.”). 
 147. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 148. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201 (Aug. 29, 2013). 
 149. See discussion supra section III.B. The courts disagreed with respect to the term 
“corporation,” but both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court agreed with respect to 
“reorganization.” 
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illustrates this. Its decisions are not arbitrary. Rather, its 
determinations of what qualifies as income are justified by the 
values—both economic and non-economic—that animate the field of 
federal income tax law. This approach to the definition of income 
facilitates the definition’s evolution and has allowed the IRS to 
address new questions that have arisen, involving caught baseballs, 
employee-retained frequent flyer miles, bitcoin, and the like. These 
interpretive decisions may be correct, dubious, or incorrect. In any 
case, they are not “deviations,” but rather are legitimate exercises of a 
shared lawmaking authority that is part and parcel of the rule of law. 
 
